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Spontaneous collapse theories provide a promising solution to the measure-
ment problem. But they also introduce a number of problems of their
own. First, the primary explanatory entity of a collapse theory the wave
function inhabits a high-dimensional space, rather than the three-dimensional
space of experience. Second, the continuity of the wave function introduces
a new and potentially problematic form of vagueness when used to describe
discrete physical systems such as particles or marbles. Third, the collapse of
the wave function is hard to reconcile with special relativity.
In response to these problems, advocates of collapse theories have pro-
posed various accounts of the primitive ontology of collapse theories postulated
underlying entities governed by the collapse theory and underwriting our ob-
servations. The most prominent of these are a mass density distribution over
three-dimensional space, and a set of discrete ash events at space-time
points. These ontologies provide strategies for solving some or all of the
problems listed above.
My argument here is that, in the case of spontaneous collapse theories,
primitive ontology is redundant, in the sense that the structures exhibited
by the primitive ontologies that allow them to solve the problems facing
spontaneous collapse theories are also present in the wave function. But
redundancy is not nonexistence; indeed, the fact that the relevant structures
are already there in the wave function shows that the mass density ontology
and the ash ontology exist whether they are explicitly postulated or not. By
the same token, there is no need to decide between a wave function ontology,
a mass density ontology and a ash ontology.
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In this regard, spontaneous collapse theories can be fruitfully contrasted
with Bohms theory. Bohmian particles are also sometimes described as
primitive ontology, in response to the concern about the dimensionality of the
wave function in particular. But in the Bohmian case, the primitive ontology
is not redundant in the above sense: the particle structure is not already
present in the wave function, but must be explicitly postulated. Hence there
is a genuine question about whether Bohmian particles exist.
2 Collapse theories
Collapse theories were introduced to solve the measurement problem in quan-
tum mechanics. The measurement problem arises because quantum states
can be superposed, whereas measurement results (apparently) cannot. For
example, suppose quantum state  A represents a particle as located in some
spatial region A, and quantum state  B represents the particle as located
in some disjoint spatial region B. Then according to quantum mechanics
there is a third quantum state  AB formed by superposing them: AB =
2 1=2( A +  B). Such states are ubiquitous in quantum mechanics, and es-
sential to its explanations.
Now consider a device that measures the location of the particle. When
the state is  A the device displays A, and when the state is  B the device
displays B. But when the state is  AB the state of the device is not
a superposition of displaying A and displaying B; rather, it displays
Ahalf the time and Bhalf the time. Indeed, it is hard to see what a
superposition of displaying Aand displaying Bcould mean.
Von Neumann (1932, 186) dealt with this problem by proposing distinct
dynamical laws for measurements and non-measurements. Between mea-
surements, the quantum state evolves according to the continuous, linear
Schrödinger dynamics von Neumanns process 2. But during a measure-
ment, the quantum state jumps discontinuously into one of the eigenstates
of the measured observable, with probabilities given by the square of the
coe¢ cient on that eigenstate in the pre-measurement state. This is von Neu-
manns process 1, otherwise known as the collapse postulate. Applied to
state  AB = 2
 1=2( A+ B), the collapse postulate says that a measurement
of the location of the particle causes the state to jump either to  A or to  B,
with probabilities 1=2 each.
The trouble with von Neumanns proposal is that the two dynamical laws
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are incompatible: neither can be reduced to the other. Furthermore, nothing
physically distinctive takes place during a measurement: a measurement isnt
a distinct kind of physical process, it is just one that has particular pragmatic
importance to us. So there seems to be no physical distinction between
measurements and non-measurements such that di¤erent fundamental laws
could apply to measurements and non-measurements.
One response to this predicament is just to reject the collapse postulate,
so that the Schrödinger dynamics applies to all systems at all times. This
is the response embodied (in di¤erent ways) by Bohmian theories (Bohm
1952) and Everettian theories (Everett 1957). But a di¤erent response is
also available namely to precisify the collapse postulate so that it makes no
essential appeal to measurement. This is the approach pursued by sponta-
neous collapse theories.
The original spontaneous collapse theory the GRW theory of Ghirardi,
Rimini andWeber (1986) incorporates two incompatible dynamical processes,
just like von Neumanns account. The rst is the Schrödinger dynamics,
which applies most of the time. The second is a collapse process, which
localizes the quantum state in the coordinates of one particle. That is, for
each particle in a system, there is a chance of 10 16 per second that it will
undergo a collapse, and if it does so, then the quantum state is multiplied
by a Gaussian of width 10 5 cm in the coordinates of that particle. The
location of the center of the collapse is chosen at random so as to reproduce
the statistical results of von Neumanns collapse postulate.
Unlike von Neumanns account, though, the GRW approach does not tie
collapse to measurement: collapses just naturally occur at a certain rate,
whether anyone is measuring a system or not. But the collapse process can
nevertheless explain why measurements have unique outcomes. For micro-
scopic systems, the collapse rate is so low that collapses are never observed.
But for a macroscopic solid object containing of the order of 1023 particles,
the collapse rate is 107 per second, and since the positions of the particles
in a solid object are highly correlated, a collapse for one particle su¢ ces to
localize the whole object.
Hence the GRW solution to the measurement problem: a single-particle
state like  AB is stable, but when the location of the particle is measured,
its position is correlated with something we can see, such as the position of
a pointer on a dial. The particle and pointer now form a composite macro-
scopic object, and the spontaneous collapse process very rapidly localizes the
state of this object, either to a state in which the particle is in region A and
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the pointer is pointing at A, or to a state in which the particle is in region
B and the pointer is pointing at B. No special new process occurs during
measurement; the measurement just amplies the naturally-occurring spon-
taneous collapse process, due to the inevitable involvement of a large number
of correlated particles.
3 Problems
As it stands, the GRW theory describes a world without particles. The
representational machinery of the theory consists of the quantum state alone,
and the quantum state, expressed as a wave function, is a spread-out entity
rather than a spatially discrete particle. After a collapse the wave function
bunches up in three coordinates, and under certain circumstances this
bunchingis relatively stable, so that we can use the language of particles
and trajectories with some success to describe the way these bunchesmove
around. But if the wave function describes all there is, then particles are not
fundamental constituents of reality.
The view that some entity represented by the wave function is all there
is (at the fundamental level) is called wave function monism (Ney 2013, 37).
Wave function monism is a natural way of understanding the ontology asso-
ciated with spontaneous collapse theories, but it raises some di¢ culties. The
rst is that the wave function is not dened over ordinary three-dimensional
space, but over a 3N -dimensional conguration space, whereN is the number
of particles in the system concerned (Bell 1987, 44). More precisely, since
there are no particles at the fundamental level, the way to put it is that
what we ordinarily think of as an N -particle system is described at the fun-
damental level by a 3N -dimensional wave function. In particular, since we
ordinarily think of the universe as a system containing a very large number
of particles, then according to wave function monism it is better conceived
as a single entity residing in a high-dimensional space.
The di¢ culty here concerns how a fundamentally high-dimensional world
can nevertheless appear to us as three-dimensional. Albert (1996) maintains
that the explanation is dynamical: the physical laws for macroscopic objects
take a particularly simple form if the 3N dimensions are grouped into threes,
and so creatures like us should be expected to have an internal model of the
world as three-dimensional. However, others are sceptical of this dynamical
explanation. Monton (2006), for example, argues that if there is no three-
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dimensional world, it is not clear that there are any creatures like uswith
internal models of the world.
A second di¢ culty with wave function monism stems from the fact that
even after a collapse, the wave function in the coordinates of the collapsed
particle is still non-zero everywhere. If we require that all the wavefunction
amplitude associated with an object be contained in a particular region if
the object is to count as being located in that region, then neither parti-
cles nor macroscopic objects ever have determinate locations according to
spontaneous collapse theories, and we have no solution to the measurement
problem after all (Albert and Loewer 1990). This is called the tails problem.
The obvious response here is to relax the requirement that all the wave
function amplitude be contained in the relevant region: for an object to be
located in a given region, it is su¢ cient that some large proportion of the
wave function amplitude is contained in it (Albert and Loewer, 1996). This
introduces a novel kind of vagueness, since presumably there is no precise
matter of fact concerning the proportion that is required. And loosening
the location requirement in this way produces other odd consequences: for
example, each of a large collection of objects can individually count as being
located in a region according to the requirement even when the collection as
a whole does not count as being in the region (Lewis 1997). This is because
when each of a collection of N objects has proportion p of its wave function
amplitude in a region, where p is slightly less than 1, the proportion of the
wave function of the whole system that is in the subspace of conguration
space corresponding to all the objects being in the region is pN , which can be
considerably less than 1. This latter problem is called the counting anomaly.
A third di¢ culty with wave function monism concerns the reconcilia-
tion of the spread-out nature of the wave function with special relativity.
A collapse in the coordinates of a particular particle a¤ects the whole of
space simultaneously, but according to special relativity there is no absolute
standard of simultaneity, so the collapse seems ill-dened. Furthermore, for
entangled particles, a collapse for any one of them instantaneously localizes
all of them, no matter how far apart they are, which is in prima facie conict
with relativistic prohibitions on faster-than-light causation (Bell 1987).
None of these di¢ culties is unique to spontaneous collapse theories. The
dimensionality problem and the counting anomaly a¤ect any account of quan-
tum mechanics that takes the wave function to represent a physical entity, in-
cluding most ways of understanding Bohmian and Everettian theories (Lewis
2016, 97 and 151). The di¢ culty with relativity also a¤ects Bohmian theo-
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ries, as the Bohmian particle dynamics apparently requires an absolute stan-
dard of simultaneity (Bell 1981). Nevertheless, this particular combination of
problems is most frequently addressed in the context of spontaneous collapse
theories, and a particular kind of solution adding ontology is also most
prevalent in the context of spontaneous collapse theories. It is this kind of
ontological solution that I am interested in here.
4 Ontological solutions
The original proposal for adding ontology to a spontaneous collapse theory
was made by Ghirardi, Grassi and Benatti (1995). They suggest adding a
mass density distribution to the theory, dened in terms of the quantum
state. Precisely, if M(r) is an operator for average mass density, then the
mass density distribution M(r; t) can be dened in terms of the quantum
state  (t) as M(r; t) = h (t) jM(r)j (t)i. It is the mass density distribu-
tion that directly accounts for the locations of macroscopic objects, and our
perceptions of them.
Their motivations for adding a mass density distribution to the theory
allude to the problems mentioned in the previous section. The mass density,
unlike the quantum state, lives in ordinary space (Ghirardi, Grassi and
Benatti 1995, 7). They regard this as an improvement over an ontology
in 3N -dimensional space, at least in the sense that it is more traditional
(Ghirardi, Grassi and Benatti 1995, 37). Furthermore, they explain in detail
how the mass density distribution avoids the tails problem: in essence, for
a macroscopic object, the spontaneous collapse process localizes the wave
function to such an extent that the mass density outside the immediate
location of the object is undetectably small (Ghirardi, Grassi and Benatti
1995, 2225).
A later article explains how the mass density ontology disposes of the
counting anomaly (Bassi and Ghirardi 1999). If an object is a region of high
mass density (surrounded by lower mass density), then when the whole of
a collection of objects has a particular location precisely when each of the
objects individually has that location. Since the location of objects according
to the mass density ontology directly depends on the mass density in a par-
ticular region of three-dimensional space, and not directly on the proportion
of wave function amplitude in a particular subspace of conguration space,
the counting anomaly does not arise.
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More recently, the mass density ontology has been taken up as an example
of primitive ontology in quantum mechanics. Proponents of primitive ontol-
ogy include Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghi (1992), Allori (2013) and Maudlin
(2013). The central constraints on primitive ontology are that its entities
reside in three-dimensional space, and that the behaviour of these entities
underwrites all the properties of the macroscopic objects we interact with
(Allori 2013, 60). Clearly the mass density ontology fulls these desiderata.
The claim of the primitive ontologist is that any adequate quantum me-
chanical theory must be written in terms of the behaviour of some or other
primitive ontology.
Allori and Maudlin both stress the importance of the three-dimensionality
of the primitive ontology. Allori (2013, 6263) echoes Ghirardi, Grassi and
Benattis claim that the mass density ontology is traditional: if you can
account for everything you need to account for employing already success-
ful and well-tested explanatory techniques, why not do so?Wave function
monism, on this view, is just too radical a break with the past. Maudlin
goes further: the primitive ontology (or primary ontology in his terminol-
ogy) has to be three-dimensional in order to determine our observations of
three-dimensional objects (2013, 148). Every empirically adequate theory
has to postulate a three-dimensional primitive ontology.
Primitive ontologies have also been suggested for other accounts of quan-
tum mechanics. A mass density ontology has been developed for the branch-
ing worlds of Everettian quantum mechanics (Allori et al. 2011). Dürr,
Goldstein, and Zanghi (1992) and Maudlin (2013) explore Bohmian quan-
tum mechanics, and identify Bohmian particles as the primitive ontology in
this case.
Conversely, other primitive ontologies have been proposed for sponta-
neous collapse theories. Most prominent is Tumulkas ash ontology (2006),
based on some comments by Bell (1987), according to which the primitive on-
tology consists of discrete events at space-time points corresponding to the
centers of GRW collapse events. This ontology too, can straightforwardly
address the issue of dimensionality, since the ashes are dened in three-
dimensional space. It also bypasses the counting anomaly, since an object
according to the ash ontology is just a swarm of ashes. Since the location
of an object depends directly on the locations of ashes in three-dimensional
space, and does not depend directly on the proportion of the wave function
in a subspace of conguration space, the counting anomaly does not arise.
Additionally, the ash ontology suggests a way forward concerning the
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conict with special relativity: since the ashes are not spread out in space,
a collapse event per se does not require instantaneous change everywhere.
Indeed, the hope of a reconciliation with special relativity is the primary mo-
tivation behind Tumulkas adoption of the ash ontology. Tumulka proposes
that, given a ash event at a particular space-time point, the probability dis-
tribution for the location of the next ash event is dened over surfaces that
are relativistically invariant that is, over surfaces such that x2+y2+z2 c2t2
is a constant rather than over simultaneity surfaces for which t is a con-
stant. Hence for a single particle, a ashyversion of the GRW theory can
be made consistent with special relativity. But for two or more particles,
there is still the worry that for entangled particles, a ash for one particle
can instantly a¤ect the future ash probabilities of the other, no matter how
distant.
5 The primitive ontologists dilemma
The story so far is that wave function monism is problematic as an ontology
for spontaneous collapse theories, and that either the mass density or the
ash ontology can address some or all of these problems. This story can be
resisted by arguing (as I have done elsewhere) that the dimensionality of the
wave function and the counting anomaly are not really problems that need
to be addressed (Lewis 2003; Lewis 2013). But perhaps some of them still
look like problems and certainly the problem of reconciling spontaneous
collapse theories with special relativity remains. Here I take a di¤erent line:
to the extent that dimensionality, the counting anomaly and consistency with
special relativity are problems for spontaneous collapse theories, primitive
ontology cannot provide distinctive solutions, despite initial appearances.
The argument is inspired by Hempels (1965) theoreticians dilemma.
Hempel points out that theoretical entities, if they do the job they are sup-
posed to do, are redundant. And if they dont do the job they are supposed
to do, they are (trivially) redundant. So they are redundant. The job, as
Hempel sees it, is to serve in explanations of observable phenomena. And
the reason they are redundant if they do their job is that an explanation is
a deductive argument from premises describing observable initial conditions
to a conclusion describing an observable phenomenon, by way of suitable
universal generalizations (laws). So an argument that uses laws mentioning
theoretical entities can be replaced without loss by an argument whose laws
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mention only observable things.
Hempels theoreticians dilemma is only a challenge to the extent that one
buys into his deductive-nomological account of explanation. If explanations
in physics are not typically deductive arguments, then the fact that one can
replace a deductive argument mentioning theoretical entities with one that
does not has no signicant consequences. In particular, theoretical entities
might well be essential elements in physical explanations.
But now consider the use of primitive ontology to solve the problems fac-
ing spontaneous collapse theories. These problems are not (directly) causal
in nature, and the role of primitive ontology is not to act as a causal interme-
diary between the wave function and the phenomena. Rather, the relevant
dependency is something like determination rather than causation. The wave
function at a time determines a mass density distribution at that time over
three-dimensional space, solving the dimensionality problem and the count-
ing anomaly. Similarly, the evolution of the wave function over a period of
time time determines a distribution of ashes over the relevant chunk of four-
dimensional space-time, solving the dimensionality problem and the counting
anomaly, and hopefully getting us closer to a recolciliation of spontaneous
collapse theories with special relativity.
Even if causal explanations are not typically deductive arguments, expla-
nations involving determination relations quite plausibly do typically involve
deductive arguments. In a classical world, a suitable arrangement of particles
entails that there is a table here. Similarly in a spontaneous collapse world
with primitive ontology: a suitable wave function entails a particular mass
density distribution, which in turn entails that there is a table here. Alter-
natively, a suitable wave function evolution entails a particular distribution
of ashes, which in turn entails that there is a table here.
In either case, the wave function entails the state of the primitive ontology,
and the state of the primitive ontology entails the state of observable things.
Hence Hempels dilemma seems to apply here: if the primitive ontology
succeeds in its role as an intermediate step in this deductive chain, then it
is redundant. If the table supervenes on the ashes, and the ashes on the
wave function, then the table supervenes directly on the wave function. If the
primitive ontology doesnt succeed in this role, then it is trivially redundant.
So it is redundant.
In particular, since the state of the primitive ontology is entailed by the
wave function, whatever structure there is in the primitive ontology that
allows it to address the dimensionality problem, the counting problem and
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the conict with relativity, is structure that is already present in the wave
function. So if primitive ontology succeeds at solving these problems, it is
redundant. And of course, if it fails to solve the problems, then it is redun-
dant. The upshot is that primitive ontology plays no crucial role in solving
the problems a­ icting spontaneous collapse theories; the wave function by
itself can perform all the relevant work. So why did we think we needed it
in the rst place?
The response may be: The primitive ontology is not supposed to be an
additional layer of reality residing between the fundamental wave function
and the observable world. Rather, the primitive ontology is an ontological
replacement for the wave function. In particular, supporters of the primitive
ontology approach often try to reconceive the wave function as a law gov-
erning the evolution of the primitive ontology (Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghi
1992; Allori 2013).
But this is a di¢ cult road to follow. The wave function in nonrelativistic
quantum mechanics changes over time, so in this context one would have to
admit that the laws of nature change over time. Perhaps this is not impossible
to contemplate (Callender 2015), but it is certainly at odds with the claim
often made in defense of primitive ontology that it is traditional, whereas
wave function monism is a radical break with the past. If the primitive
ontology approach requires time-evolving laws, this is a quite radical break
too arguably more radical than admitting a fundamental entity that is most
readily dened over a high-dimensional space.
Alternatively, one can hope that in the ultimate relativistic quantum the-
ory, the quantum state will not change over time (Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghi
1992). Goldstein and Zanghi (2013) show how, in a Bohmian theory with
a time-independent wave function, the particles can still move, and hence
the wave function can act as a law directing the primitive ontology. But no
such approach is applicable to a spontaneous collapse approach, in which the
dynamical role of the wave function in undergoing collapses seems essential
to the theory. Certainly the most straightforward approach to understanding
spontaneous collapse theories is that the quantum state is indeed a state, and
hence a representation of the ontology of the system.
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6 Primitive ontology made easy
The argument of the previous section is that primitive ontology is redun-
dant. In causal contexts, redundancy arguments are typically followed by
non-existence claims: if a postulated entity is explanatorily redundant, then
we shouldnt say it exists. For example, if an absolute rest frame plays no ex-
planatory role in mechanics, then we should say that there is no absolute rest
frame. But that wouldnt be appropriate in the case of primitive ontology.
The issue here isnt causal redundancy but what we might call compositional
redundancy: if tables are nothing but distributions of mass density, and mass
density distributions are nothing but wave function distributions, then ta-
bles are nothing but wave function distributions (and similarly for the ash
ontology). Compositional redundancy doesnt lend itself to non-existence
claims. I am nothing but an arrangement of cells (lets say), and my cells
are nothing but an arrangement of molecules, but it doesnt follow that cells
dont exist. Indeed, it trivially follows from the existence and arrangement
of the molecules that my cells exist.
This is an instance the easy approach to ontology of Thomasson (2014).
Tables exist, because all it takes for a table to exist is that the more funda-
mental ontology is arranged in a certain way. So, by the same token, if the
wave function represents something physical, then the mass density ontol-
ogy exists and so does the ash ontology. The wave function distribution
instantiates a particular mass density distribution over three-dimensional
space. And the evolution of the wave function over time instantiates a set
of ashes in space-time, since collapse event exist, and a ash is nothing but
the center of a collapse event.
So the redundancy argument of the previous section should not be taken
to be an argument against the existence of either the mass density ontology
or the ash ontology. Rather, it should be taken as an argument that we
dont have to explicitly postulate them, or to decide between them, since
they both come along for freewith wave function monism.
Indeed, both ontologies are important. The wave function is a highly
structured entity. It contains the structures exemplied by the mass density
distribution and by the ash distribution, in the sense that it entails both
these structures. These structures do not exhaust the structure of the wave
function, of course: the wave function entails the mass density distribution
and the ash distribution, but not vice versa.
This is reected in the fact that the quantum state cannot be represented
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in four-dimensional space-time. (At least, it cannot easily be represented in a
four-dimensional space-time: see Wallace and Timpson (2010) for a proposal
about how to do so.) But nevertheless, the space-time structure is there,
and the existence of three-dimensional primitive ontology shows that it is
there. Similarly, the wave function contains structures we can use to solve
the counting anomaly, and the use of the mass density language or the ash
language to solve the counting anomaly shows this.
What about the conict with special relativity? This is not so easily laid
to rest. But the fact that the ash structure is present in the wave function
gives some hope for the success of Tumulkas program. We do not need to say
in addition that the wave function itself doesnt exist, even if there is a sense
in which it is spread out in three-dimensional space (i.e. the sense expressed
by the mass density distribution). Because of this spread-out nature, the
wave function has di¤erent properties in di¤erent frames of reference, but
this doesnt impugn it (Myrvold 2002). After all, cars and tunnels have
di¤erent properties in di¤erent frames of reference: in one frame the car is
longer than the tunnel, and in another the tunnel is longer than the car
(Maudlin 1994, 54). And they certainly exist.
It is worth contrasting this with the case of Bohms theory. Dürr, Gold-
stein and Zanghi (1992) and Maudlin (2013) count the particles of Bohms
theory as an example of primitive ontology, but it is important to note that,
unlike the primitive ontologies proposed for spontaneous collapse theories,
the existence and locations of the Bohmian particles are not entailed by the
wave function. Rather, they have to be postulated separately, along with a
new dynamical law to govern their motion. If you dont postulate particles in
addition to the wave function in a no-collapse context, you end up with the
ontology of a many-worlds theory. Bohms theory and many-worlds theories
are very di¤erent, with di¤erent strengths and weaknesses. So here there
is a genuine, and di¢ cult, ontological question. In the case of spontaneous
collapse theories, though, questions about the existence of primitive ontology
are easily answerable in the a¢ rmative.
7 Conclusion
Often the ontology of spontaneous collapse theories is presented as a choice:
either one adopts wave function monism, or one adopts a mass density ontol-
ogy, or one adopts a ash ontology (e.g. Ney 2013, 40). My argument here
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is that there is no pressing need to make such a choice. The wave function
ontology entails the mass density ontology and the ash ontology, and with it
the solutions to the apparent problems facing spontaneous collapse theories.
Indeed, using the language of a mass density distribution or a ash distribu-
tion may be useful in explaining exactly how the problems can be resolved.
But using these languages doesnt undermine the idea that ultimately, for a
spontaneous collapse theory, all there is is the wave function.
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